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EMPIRICISM, RELIGION, AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Stephen M. Feldman*
Most people would acknowledge that religious orientation often influences an
individual's political values or preferences. Members of evangelical Protestant denomi-
nations, for example, are more likely to be conservative Republicans than liberal Demo-
crats. Empirical studies in political science reinforce this common sense view.'
But what about judicial decision-making? Do judges' religious orientations
influence their votes or decisions when resolving judicial disputes? To me, the
answer to this question is obvious: yes. To me, this is common sense. But for many,
this assertion is controversial. It challenges basic assumptions about the rule of law
and the independence of the judiciary.2
Many lawyers, judges, and law professors would insist that neither a judge's
political preferences, in general, nor a judge's religious affiliation, more specifi-
cally, should affect decision-making. Any such influence would corrupt the judicial
process. Judging should be neutral and apolitical. In other words, judges, including
United States Supreme Court Justices, should decide cases in accordance with
judicial precedents and legal doctrines, not because of political or religious values.
Most political scientists, of course, scoff at this internal view of adjudication. They
subscribe instead to an external view: at least at the Supreme Court, Justices vote their
political preferences. In the words of Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, the leading
proponents of the so-called attitudinal model: "Simply put, [William] Rehnquist votes
the way he does because he is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted
the way he did because he is extremely liberal."3
Recently, an incongruous clash between the legal (internal) and the political science
(external) views of judicial decision-making shadowed the ill-fated Supreme Court
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor
of Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Richard Delgado and Greg Sisk for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also appreciate Rick Duncan's invitation to participate
on a Law and Religion panel at the 2006 Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
Conference, which prompted me to write this Essay.
Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making
of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507, 507 (1999). Clyde Wilcox
emphasizes the political conservatism of Christian fundamentalists while acknowledging that the
precise identification of fundamentalists is controversial. Clyde Wilcox, Fundamentalists and
Politics: An Analysis of the Effects ofDiffering Operational Definitions, 48 J. POL 1041 (1986).
2 When Daniel R. Pinello asked law professors for help in identifying the religious affilia-
tion of several judges, Pinello received a "heated" response from at least some professors.
DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 156 (2003).
' JEFFREY A. SEGAL& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrrruDINAL
MODEL 65 (1993).
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nomination of Harriet Miers. On the one hand, the Bush administration trumpeted
Miers' s commitment to judicial restraint, to interpreting the Constitution faithfully, and
to following the rule of law. Of course, every Supreme Court nominee must be
depicted similarly. When would any administration nominate an individual and then
declare, "She will ignore the law and impose her personal preferences on the rest of
the country!"? Yet, President Bush also emphasized Miers's religious affiliation, as if
it were a credential qualifying her to be a Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, many conser-
vatives applauded Miers' s religiosity-and her more specific religious commitments-
while many liberals worried about the same.4 But why would Miers's religious
orientation matter at all if Supreme Court decision-making were neutral and apolitical?
Didn't conservatives and liberals both stress Miers's religiosity exactly because they
hoped, or feared, that her religious views would influence her interpretations of legal
texts, particularly the Constitution?
In this Essay, I will prioritize neither the external nor internal understandings of
judicial decision-making. Indeed, I have elsewhere argued that, particularly at the
Supreme Court level, both approaches are valid and can be harmonized. They are not
necessarily antithetical.5 Nonetheless, I will argue that law professors should pay more
attention to empirical studies showing that a judge's religious orientation influences
decision-making. To be sure, then, I argue from one side of the law-political-science-
divide in this particular Essay, but not because the other side is wrong. Rather, I argue
from the political science side exactly because law professors so often seem to
disregard it. Of course, this disregard can be partly explained by disciplinary boundaries:
law professors primarily read legal scholarship, while political scientists primarily
read political science scholarship. Even so, each side-the law professors and the
political scientists-would profit from listening to what the other is saying.
Given the context of this Essay-addressed to an audience mostly of law profes-
sors-I do not need to advocate for the acceptance of the internal or legal view of
judicial decision-making. A couple of anecdotes suggest the need to argue for the
worthiness of an external view. In the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision
holding that the denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated the state
constitution, the majority opinion stated:
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical con-
victions that marriage should be limited to the union of one man
and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many
hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions that
same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that homosexual
4 E.g., Edward Lazarus, Original Sin, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2005, at 15 (discussing
Miers's commitment to strict constructionism); Noam Scheiber, Merit Scholars, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 17, 2005, at 6 (discussing Miers's religion).
' Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal
and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89 (2005).
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persons should be treated no differently than their heterosexual
neighbors. Neither view answers the question before us. Our
concern is with the Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of
governance ....
The court claimed, in other words, that religious views are irrelevant to consti-
tutional interpretation. Now, one might respond that this assertion was standard
judicial rhetoric and should not be taken seriously; the judges, that is, knew religion
mattered. My second anecdote suggests otherwise. In the summer of 2002, the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) and the American Political Science
Association (APSA)jointly sponsored a Conference on Constitutional Law. According
to its organizers, the Conference's goals were "ambitious," "broad," and "deep."7 The
Conference sought to "foster interdisciplinary approaches to constitutional law."8 Law
professors and political scientists alike were thus invited to "be a part of a collabo-
rative community."9 Unfortunately, despite these laudable purposes, the Conference
showcased the persistent disciplinary differences rather than fusing a collaborative
community of interdisciplinary scholars. When political scientists spoke, they favored
political explanations of Supreme Court decision-making. Some political scientists
willingly discussed legal doctrine, yet they clearly assumed that political attitudes
primarily determined Justices' votes. Meanwhile, when legal academics spoke, they
typically invoked Supreme Court cases and the concomitant legal doctrines. To listen
to the law professors, one would think legal doctrine not only mattered to but chiefly
determined judicial outcomes, including in hard constitutional cases. Even the most
sophisticated constitutional scholars, it seemed, followed the internal approach, at
least to a significant degree.
Part I of this Essay examines several empirical studies that relate to the influ-
ence of religion on judicial decision-making.1 ° Part 1I explores the inherent limita-
tions of these studies.1 The results should not be taken as unequivocal proof of any
hypotheses, but rather as evidence of certain tendencies in judicial decision-making.
The Conclusion emphasizes the salience of religion in distinguishing social groups.
I. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND RELIGION
From a theoretical standpoint, the reason that politics necessarily influences judicial
decision-making is that the interpretation of legal texts is not mechanical. When the
Supreme Court decides a case, the Justices must interpret case precedents and other
6 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003).
7 Assoc. of Am. Law Schools, Conference on Constitutional Law: Why Attend?,
http://www.aals.org/profdev/constitutional/why.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
8 id.
9 Id.
'o See infra text accompanying notes 12-59.
' See infra text accompanying notes 60-77.
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legal texts, including the Constitution. Like with all interpretation, legal interpretation is
simultaneously enabled and constrained by our participation in communal traditions,
which inculcate us with expectations, interests, and prejudices. Our expectations, in-
terests, and prejudices open us to the meaning of the text, but also limit our possible under-
standings of the text. When we interpret a text, we can therefore discuss and debate its
meaning, but we can never determine the meaning through some mechanical or metho-
dical process. Our expectations, interests, and prejudices include, of course, our political
preferences. Moreover, culturally inculcated values, whether religiously based or otherwise,
can be categorized as contributing to our political preferences or as a distinct component
of our expectations, interests, and prejudices. Either way, one's cultural background, includ-
ing religion, and one's political preferences are always integral to legal interpretation. 2
At least two types of empirical research support the thesis that religious orienta-
tion influences judicial decision-making. One type of research is general, while the
other is more specific. The general research comes from social psychology and shows
that an individual's sense of membership in a social group strongly influences the
person's values and perceptions. 3 Group membership shapes cognitive processes as
well as the most basic emotional reactions.'" Individuals "tend to perceive themselves
12 See Feldman, supra note 5, at 99-129 (articulating an interpretive-structural theory of
Supreme Court decision-making).
13 See, e.g., MarilynnB. Brewer, The Social Sef: On Being the Same andDifferent at the Same
Time, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 475 (1991); Marilynn B. Brewer & Sherry K.
Schneider, Social Identity and Social Dilemmas: A Double-edged Sword, in SOCIAL IDENTITY
THEORY: CONSTRUCIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 169 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg
eds., 1990); Johan M.G. van der Dennen, Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group Differentia-
tion: A Review and Interpretation of the Literature, in THE SOCIOBIOLoGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM
1 (Vernon Reynolds et al. eds., 1986); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: The
Benefits of Recategorization, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 239 (1989); Norman
Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer, Categorization Effects on Ingroup and Outgroup Perception, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 209 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds.,
1986); James Sidanius, The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: A
Social Dominance Perspective, in EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 183 (Shanto
Iyengar & William J. McGuire eds., 1993); Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity
Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7 (Stephen
Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 2d ed. 1986); Wolfgang T6nnesmann, Group Identifica-
tion and Political Socialisation, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM 175 (Vernon
Reynolds et al. eds., 1986); John C. Turner, The Experimental Social Psychology ofIntergroup
Behaviour, in INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 66 (John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981).
" For discussions of cognitive processes, see Richard E. Nisbett et al., Culture and Systems
of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291,291-92 (2001), and
Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self.: Implications for Cognition,
Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224,224-25, 231-35 (1991). For a discussion of
emotions, see Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, The Cultural Construction of Self and
Emotion: Implications for Social Behavior, in EMOTION AND CULTURE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES
OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE 89, 89-91 (Shinobu Kitayama & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994).
"[P]sychological group membership is first of all a perceptual and cognitive affair, and... an
[Vol. 15:43
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as having similar or identical goals to members of their own group and different or
opposed goals to members of other groups."' 5 Thus, even an individual's assessment
of self-interest varies with group membership. 16
Unsurprisingly, then, social psychology research also shows that group membership
shapes an individual's evaluations of in-group members as well as of members of other
distinct social groups. In-group-out-group perceptions strongly control social attitudes
and interactions. An individual tends to "favor in-group members in the allocation of
rewards, in their personal regard, and in the evaluation of the products of their labor.'
17
Simultaneously, the individual tends to disfavor out-group members. As one psycholo-
gist writes, "mere categorisation is sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination."'
' 8
Another researcher explains that "prejudice and discrimination" are not "pathological
or quasi-pathological conditions" but rather the normal or "default conditions" of po-
litical societies.' 9 In other words, favoring one's own group members and discriminat-
ing against others is a normal feature of social identity. "[I]ngroup favoritism and
outgroup hostility are... consequences of the unit formation between self and other
ingroup members and the linking of one's identity to them."20 When tangible conflicts
between social groups arise, the cohesion within each respective group and the salience
of the division between groups are both likely to increase. Yet, even when there is no
tangible conflict, individuals are likely to discriminate against outgroup members.E'
In light of this research regarding social group identity, one would expect that if an
individual identifies him- or herself as part of a particular religious community or group--
for example, evangelical Protestants, Roman Catholics, or Jews-then the individual's
values and perceptions will be shaped by the respective social (religious) identity. If the
individual is ajudge, then the judge's religious orientation would likely influence his or her
interpretation of legal texts, including the First Amendment. This thesis is reinforced by
the extensive political science research showing that Supreme Court Justices frequently
decide according to their political preferences, and the psychology and political science
studies suggesting that, in many circumstances, religious identities and differences are
especially salient.22 Unsurprisingly, then, more specific empirical research reveals that
emotional involvement with the group may follow as a consequence of the perceived group
membership." Tonnesmann, supra note 13, at 184.
'5 Turner, supra note 13, at 97.
16 Brewer, supra note 13, at 476; Brewer & Schneider, supra note 13, at 170.
17 Gaertner et al., supra note 13, at 239.
I8 van der Dennen, supra note 13, at 17.
19 Sidanius, supra note 13, at 215.
20 Miller & Brewer, supra note 13, at 213.
2 "[A]n individual will discriminate against a member of an out-group even when there is
no conflict of interest and there is no past history of intergroup hostility." van der Dennen, supra
note 13, at 17.
22 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrrrUDINAL MODEL REvIsrrED (2002) (marshaling empirical support for attitudinal model);
Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1529
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religious orientation is likely to influence ajudge's resolution of legal issues. These
recent empirical studies, albeit few in number, come in two basic forms: first, a focus
on cases unrelated to religious freedom per se, and second, a focus explicitly on
religious-freedom cases.23
In a 1999 study, Donald R. Songer and Susan J. Tabrizi explored the influences of
religious affiliation on state court judges deciding death penalty, obscenity, and gender
discrimination cases-cases that did not present express issues of religious freedom
but that nonetheless entailed political or moral stances likely to intertwine with an
individual's religious beliefs.24 The empirical evidence demonstrated that "the religious
affiliation of the judges appears to exert a substantial influence."' Overall,
evangelical judges were substantially more likely to cast conserva-
tive votes than their mainline Protestant brethren .... Catholic
(2000) (summarizing empirical studies supporting the attitudinal model); supra note 1 and
accompanying text (discussing and citing studies emphasizing influence of religious affiliation
on political outlooks). It is worth noting that, until recently, the Supreme Court remained over-
whelmingly Protestant. Through 1990, ninety-one of 104 Supreme Court Justices came from
Protestant backgrounds, while from the 1940s through the 1970s, no more than one Catholic and
one Jew ever sat on the Court at any time. Eight Justices were Roman Catholic: Roger B. Taney
(appointed in 1835), Edward D. White (1894), Joseph McKenna (1897), Pierce Butler (1922),
Frank Murphy (1939), William J. Brennan Jr. (1956), Antonin Scalia (1986), and Anthony M.
Kennedy (1987). See 2 DAvID G. SAVAGE, GUIDETO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 796, 910 (4th
ed. 2004). Five Justices were Jewish: Louis D. Brandeis (1916), Benjamin N. Cardozo (1932),
Felix Frankfurter(1939), ArthurJ. Goldberg (1962), and Abe Fortas (1965). Id. James F. Byrnes,
who served as an Associate Justice during the 1941-1942 term, was born into a Roman Catholic
family, but converted to Episcopalianism when he married in 1906. More recently, two more
Jewish Justices have been appointed: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven G. Breyer. Clarence
Thomas was born a Baptist, raised a Catholic, began attending an Episcopal church, and most
recently, returned to Catholicism. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRA-
PHiES, 1789-1995, at 526-530 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995) (detailing Thomas's religious
background through 1995). In fact, if Thomas is categorized as Catholic, then 1996 marked
the first time that a majority of the Justices were not Protestant. ERIC MICHAEL MAZUR, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF REIGIOUS MINORrrIEs: CONFRONTING THE CONSTrTIONAL ORDER 12,
179 n.3. With the confirmation of Samuel Alito, the Court now has a majority of Catholics:
Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas. See Franklin Foer, Brain Trust, NEW REPUBUC,
Nov. 14, 2005, at 6.
23 I will discuss the following: DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW
(2003); James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul
of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 491 (2004); Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The
Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507 (1999).
For citations to other sources, see PINELLO, supra, at 218-20 & nn. 15-23.
24 Songer & Tabrizi, supra note 23.
25 Id. at521.
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judges were also more likely than mainline Protestants to support
conservative outcomes, but they were less conservative than the
Protestant evangelicals. Jewish judges had voting patterns that
were similar to those of mainline Protestants.26
Songer and Tabrizi concluded by attempting to fit their conclusions into the attitudinal
model so predominant in political science. They reasoned that religious affiliation influ-
enced a judge's political attitudes or preferences and, therefore, that political scientists
should identify judges' political values by examining both political party and religious
affiliations.27 In a similar study not explicitly focused on religious freedom, Daniel
Pinello explored the factors that influence judicial decisions regarding gay rights.2 He
concluded that judges' religious affiliations significantly correlated with their votes
either to favor or disfavor gay rights: the highest percentage of judges to favor gay rights
were Jewish, with mainstream Protestants next, then Catholics, and then fundamentalist
Protestants being most hostile.29
In 1999, James C. Brent published an empirical study of free exercise decisions in
the United States Courts of Appeals.30 He was especially concerned with whether the
lower federal court judges were more likely to heed Supreme Court doctrine, as articu-
lated in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,3 or a con-
gressional mandate, as articulated in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).32
In the typical free exercise case, the claimant seeks an exemption (or exception) from
a generally applicable law that burdens the exercise of his or her religion. The claimant,
that is, asks the court to order the government to accommodate religion. For example,
Air Force regulations prohibited wearing a hat or other head covering in certain
circumstances, yet religious convictions mandated that Orthodox Jews always keep
their heads covered (by wearing, for example, a yarmulke or skull-cap). Consequently,
in Goldman v. Weinberger, an Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer sought a free exercise
exemption so that he could follow his religious convictions while remaining in the Air
Force.33 In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court set forth a strict scrutiny test that until
1990 would remain the presumptive standard for resolving such cases: a state could
justify a burden on an individual's free exercise of religion only by showing that the
26 Id. Songer and Tabrizi concluded that the conservatism of evangelical judges was most
strongly evident in gender discrimination cases. Id. On the definition of evangelicals and
mainline Protestants, see id. at 509, 513.
27 Id. at 523.
2 PINELLO, supra note 23, at 87-91.
29 id.
30 Brent, supra note 23, at 236.
31 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
33 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Court rejected Goldman's claim.
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state action was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.-" Otherwise, the
government would be required to accommodate the religious practices. In deciding
Smith in 1990, the Court expressly abandoned the Sherbert strict scrutiny test for most
free exercise challenges to laws of general applicability. Apart from a couple of narrow
exceptional situations, the Court suggested that the "political process" would effectively
determine the scope of free exercise rights.35 Under Smith, courts were to show remark-
able deference to the legislative process. After the Court decided Smith, however,
Congress attempted to reinstate the strict scrutiny test by enacting RFRA in 1993. Al-
though the Court eventually invalidated the Act, Brent examined whether the lower courts
followed the Smith doctrine or the RFRA mandate during the "brief life" of the statute.36
Brent concluded that, overall, free exercise claimants were generally unsuccessful
at the Court of Appeals level. They won only 26.1% of their cases while losing 69.9%.37
He explained this result partly by referring to the influence of religion on the legislative
process: "Because of the majoritarian process, lawmakers are less likely to adopt laws
that place burdens on adherents of Christianity, the majority religion., 3' Thus, members
of mainstream Christian denominations are less likely than are members of religious
outgroups to find their religious beliefs or practices infringed by generally applicable
laws.39 More to the point, Brent found that "claimants who belonged to mainstream
Catholic and Protestant sects were more likely to win than were claimants who belonged
to other religions (38.9% vs. 2 4 .5 %). ' 0 Finally, Brent concluded that the "Court of
Appeals became more hostile to religious free exercise claims after Smith and became
more receptive to such claims after the passage of RFRA. The lower courts appear wil-
ling to act as the agents of both the Supreme Court and Congress."'
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss conducted an empirical
study (the Sisk study) that examined the resolution of religious freedom issues, includ-
ing free exercise and establishment clause cases, in the lower federal courts (both
district courts and the Courts of Appeals) from 1986 through 1995.42 Publishing in
2004, the authors concluded: "In our study of religious freedom decisions, the single
most prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial decisionmaking was
religion-religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge,
and the demographics of the community." '43 Thus, while still seeking future empirical
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
36 Brent, supra note 23, at 240; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(striking down RFRA).
3' Brent, supra note 23, at 249. Brent coded four percent of the cases as having a "mixed
result." Id.
38 Id. at 248.
39 See id. at 259 (discussing definition of mainstream religion).
40 Id. at 250--51.
4' Id. at 236 (abstract) (emphasis added).
42 Sisk et aL, supra note 23.
41 Id. at 614.
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confirmation, the Sisk study suggested that "religious factors are meaningfully associ-
ated with judging outcomes." The Sisk study agreed with Brent in finding that main-
line Protestants rarely became religious freedom claimants-in only 1.7% of the cases.4'
The Sisk study also found that most free exercise claimants lose, and unsurprisingly,
that "judges from Jewish and non-mainstream Christian backgrounds were significantly
more likely to approve claims for accommodation." Similarly, in Establishment Clause
cases, most claimants lose, though the success rate is higher than for free exercise claims:
42.3% vs. 35.6%.47 Moreover, and again like the free exercise context, non-mainstream
judges tended to be more receptive to Establishment Clause claimants. In particular,
"Jewish judges and Asian-American/Latino judges (but not African-American judges)
were significantly more likely to uphold Establishment Clause claims."
When it came to the religion of the claimants, the Sisk study found, again pre-
dictably, that Muslims, far outside the American religious mainstream, "may be sig-
nificantly disadvantaged in asserting Free Exercise/Accommodation claims." 9 None-
theless, one of the authors' more surprising findings concerned the judicial treatment
of Catholic and Baptist free exercise claimants seeking religious accommodations.
They were "significantly less likely to succeed" than other claimants.' One might
initially expect claimants from such mainstream Christian groups to fare well in litiga-
tion. In fact, recall that Brent found that mainstream Catholics and Protestants were
more likely than non-mainstream claimants to win free exercise claims.5' Yet, two ear-
lier studies of free exercise cases reached conclusions somewhat consistent with the
Sisk study findings. Publishing in 1983, Frank Way and Barbara J. Burt considered the
success of members of marginal religions in free exercise claims in all state and federal
courts during two time periods, 1946 to 1956 and 1970 to 1980.52 As other researchers
would conclude, they found that members of mainline religions rarely would need to
litigate a free exercise claim.53 Members of marginal religions, they explained, were
" Id. "In sum, our study provides concrete evidence to support the observation by Donald
Songer and Susan Tabrizi that 'religious affiliation may provide a useful indicator ofjudicial
values that has been ignored by previous studies examining the impact of judges' values on
their decisions."' Id. at 503.
' Id. at 563. "Mainline Protestantism was defined as consisting of the following denomi-
nations: American Baptist, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Church of the Brethren,
Episcopal, Lutheran (except Missouri Synod), Moravian Church, Presbyterian, Reformed
Church, Congregational/United Church of Christ, and United Methodist." Id. at 577 n.317.
46 Id. at 555, 557.
47 Id. at 555,571.
41 Id. at 572.
49 Id. at 566.
So Id. at 557.
s' Brent, supra note 23, at 250-51.
52 Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 652 (1983).
" Id. at 656.
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more likely to initiate "free exercise litigation because membership in a marginal group
can bring the faithful into conflict with secular norms, administrative regulations, or
statutes."' Regardless, Way and Burt concluded, harmoniously with the Sisk study,
that free exercise claimants from marginal groups won more often than did claimants
from mainline religions." Then, in a 1993 article, Joseph A. Ignagni examined United
States Supreme Court free exercise decisions from 1961 to 1990.56 Ignagni tested sev-
eral hypotheses, including one based on Way and Burt's study, namely "that if the reli-
gious group involved in a dispute can be deemed marginal, the Supreme Court will be
more likely to uphold its free exercise claims. 57 Like Way and Burt, Ignagni concluded
that the empirical evidence showed that the Court favors such marginal religious groups. 58
11. LIMITATIONS
So, what does all this mean? Clearly, empirical research should not be accepted
unconditionally, not when different studies reach results that are, if not conflicting, at
least in tension. One must remain skeptical of hypotheses and conclusions in publica-
tions from any discipline, whether law, political science, or social psychology. One
must dig below the surface to seek explanations for various results. Way and Burt
themselves suggested that the apparent relative success of marginal-religion claimants
might be due to the nature of their free exercise claims. Such claims generally sprang
from serious infringements on religious practices, while mainline free exercise claims
typically concerned insignificant burdens arising from zoning or taxing laws 9.5 The
Sisk study also suggested why members of mainstream religions, Baptists and Catho-
lics, might be expected to lose a disproportionate percentage of free exercise claims.
As numerous researchers have concluded, mainline Protestants are unlikely to raise free
exercise claims--Catholics too are unlikely to do so, though more likely than mainline
Protestants6°---exactly because they are in the religious mainstream. Most legislators
(or other lawmakers) either belong to or are fully aware of the mainstream religions and
thus are unlikely to adopt general laws that seriously interfere with mainstream prac-
tices and beliefs. In other words, the nature of democratic processes assures that legisla-
tion ordinarily will protect, not burden, the mainstream. Thus, when a Catholic or
Baptist challenges a generally applicable law and seeks a free exercise exemption, that
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Joseph A. Ignagni, U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making and the Free Exercise
Clause, 55 REv. POL 511 (1993). Using a "cognitive-cybemetic decision-maker" model, which
overlapped with the attitudinal model, Ignagni viewed the justices "as political decision-
makers who have computational limitations." Id. at 516-17, 528.
Id. at 518.
58 Id. at 527.
9 Way & Burt, supra note 52, at 656-58.
o Sisk et al., supra note 23, at 563-64.
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claimant has, almost by definition, taken him- or herself out of the mainstream. As the
Sisk study explained, "when traditionalist Catholics and Baptists resist governmental
regulation of private conduct by seeking court-ordered exemptions from, for example,
anti-discrimination or licensing laws, they run against the grain of mainstream secular
society, particularly in metropolitan localities. ' The Sisk study added that some
judges "may consciously or unconsciously" conclude that such claimants are being
overly aggressive by seeking judicial relief.62 These judges imply that the claimants,
instead of litigating, should work through the democratic process precisely because they
belong to the mainstream.63
A careful reader of empirical studies should remember that each researcher
started with a particular perspective, with certain assumptions, both overt and tacit.
These assumptions inevitably influenced the researcher's choice of subject matter
and methods. Both the Way and Burt study and the Ignagni study began with hypo-
theses consistent with the oft-stated belief that, as a general matter, the Supreme
Court boldly protects discrete and insular minorities against majoritarian overreach-
ing. Given that other (empirical) researchers have refuted this nonetheless still-
common belief,' one should only accept Way and Burt's and Ignagni's conclusions
with circumspection. 6' The Sisk study authors themselves revealed how ostensibly
conflicting studies can sometimes be reconciled. They acknowledged a tension be-
tween their results and those of Brent regarding the effect of the Smith decision on the
61 Id. at 566.
62 Id. at 564.
63 See id. at 564-66 (attributing the lack of relief for these two groups to judicial distrust
of politically active social conservatives).
' See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). Michael J. Klarman has attempted to explain why
"the myth of the heroically countermajoritarian Court" persists despite "consistently contra-
vening evidence." Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolu-
tions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996); cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-37 (1991) (arguing that courts can rarely
generate social reform).
65 Way and Burt also found that "the majority of all [free exercise] claimants lost their
cases, and further, with the exception of cases involving family relations, leafleting-soliciting-
proselytizing, and religious rights of prisoners, they lost by wide margins." Way & Burt,
supra note 52, at 662. Given that members of marginal religions brought most of the claims,
the significance of their success-rate should not be overstated. Ignagni built his free exercise
study on his earlier study of the Burger Court's Establishment Clause decisions. Joseph A.
Ignagni, Explaining and Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making: The Burger Court's
Establishment Clause Decisions, 36 J. CHURCH & ST. 301,302 (1994). While this article was
published after Ignagni's free exercise article, it was nonetheless based on his earlier disser-
tation, written in 1990. Ignagni, supra note 56, at 515 n.17. Ignagni also published a
subsequent Establishment Clause study. Joseph A. Ignagni, Supreme Court Decision Making:
An Individual-Level Analysis of the Establishment Clause Cases During the Burger and
Rehnquist Court Years, 15 AM. REv. POL. 21 (1994).
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lower courts. Eventually, though, the Sisk study authors explained that the apparently
conflicting results reflected "different nuances and inherent limitations in each study.'"
Indeed, "when the data is closely examined," the authors concluded, the possible
conflict between the studies disappeared: "[o]ur results are consistent with Brent's." 67
Frequently, a researcher's assumptions will find expression in key definitions.
For instance, if one seeks to draw conclusions contrasting mainstream and non-
mainstream religions, one must define the mainstream. One must categorize dif-
ferent religions as falling on one side of the line or the other. Way and Burt as well
as Ignagni defined mainline religions to include Judaism. 68 Brent refused to do so,
partly because Jews constitute such a small numerical minority in the United
States-only 2.3% of the population.69 For that reason, Brent's characterization of
the mainstream, including "only major Catholic and Protestant (e.g., Presbyterians,
Baptists, Lutherans, Episcopalians, etc.) sects," carries more force.7" Given the
religious makeup of the nation-ninety percent of Americans believe Jesus Christ
truly lived and seventy percent "believe he was truly God"-all non-Christian
religions should, it seems, be considered marginal or outside the mainstream. 1
Indeed, one might question whether Catholics should be deemed mainstream. On
the one hand, if one divides Protestants into their respective sects and denomina-
tions, Catholics have constituted the largest Christian grouping in the United States
' Sisk et al., supra note 23, at 567-68.
67 Id. at 568.
6' Ignagni, supra note 56, at 523; Way & Burt, supra note 52, at 654 n.7.
69 With regard to the distinction between mainstream and nonmainstream religions,
Brent wrote:
Operationalizing this variable poses at least two problems. First, our
religious culture is often described as "Judeo-Christian." A question might
be raised regarding whether Judaism constitutes a mainstream religion.
For the purposes of this article, Judaism is classified as a nonmainstream
religion. It is classified in this manner for two reasons. First, only 2.3% of
the population claims to be Jewish. Thus, in terms of sheer numbers, Jews
constitute a distinct minority. Second, the Supreme Court historically has
not been particularly accommodating to Jews in free exercise cases.
A second problem of operationalization is that many religions are
"Christian" in that they profess some sort of belief in Jesus Christ.
However, many of these religions fall outside of the mainstream
Christian tradition. Examples of nonmainstream Christian religions
include Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Unitarians, the
Vow of the Nazarite, and Church of Jesus Christ Christian (an arm of
the Aryan Nation). Therefore, for the purposes of this study, main-
stream religions include only major Catholic and Protestant (e.g.,
Presbyterians, Baptists, Lutherans, Episcopalians, etc.) sects.
Brent, supra note 23, at 259 (citation omitted).
70 Id.
71 ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 300 (John F.
Wilson ed., 1988).
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since the mid-nineteenth century.72 On the other hand, the total number of Protestants
has always far outnumbered Catholics, and many Protestants have expressed vehement
anti-Catholicism at different points in American history. Several recent historical
studies have detailed how Protestant anti-Catholicism influenced the conceptualiza-
tion of church-state relations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.73 While
overt anti-Catholicism has certainly diminished since World War II (as has overt
anti-Semitism and racism), the Sisk study authors reluctantly admitted that it "is possible
that residual antipathy toward Catholicism may persist in the federal judiciary. 74
The significance of this definitional problem should not be understated. Recall
that Ignagni categorized Judaism, somewhat questionably, as a mainstream rather
than a marginal religion. He then concluded that the Supreme Court had favored
marginal religious groups in free exercise cases. Remarkably, though, the Court has
never granted a free exercise exemption to any non-Christian claimant. Yet, the
Court has granted exemptions to members of small Christian sects, such as the Old
Order Amish. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for instance, the majority opinion rhapsodized
about the Amish commitment "to a life in harmony with nature and the soil, as
exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America
during much of our early national life.', 75 The Court even quoted the New Testament
in reasoning that "the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction .... -76 Obviously, then,
a researcher's conclusions will be influenced by how he or she categorizes Jews and
the Old Order Amish: are either or both mainstream or marginal?
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion suggests, these empirical studies necessarily have
limitations. They do not unequivocally prove any hypotheses, but rather provide
72 THOMAS BAILEY ET AL., THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 306 (11 th ed. i998) (noting that,
by 1850, the Catholic Church was the largest Christian group, with 1.8 million members).
71 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 193-94 (2002); Thomas C.
Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modem Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121
(2001); Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History,
the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 231-35 (2003); John C. Jeffries, Jr.
& James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279,
281-82 (2001); cf STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS:
A CRrIcAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997) (focusing on the
relation between anti-Semitism and the development of the separation of church and state).
71 Sisk et al., supra note 23, at 565.
71 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
76 Id. at 216 ("[T]he Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their
faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical
injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 'be not conformed to this world....' This
command is fundamental to the Amish faith.").
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evidence of certain tendencies in judicial decision-making. Specifically, the religious
orientations of both the judge (or judges) and the claimants appear to affect whether
or not a religious freedom claim, particularly one brought under the free exercise
clause, is likely to be either validated or invalidated. More generally, an individual's
perceived membership in a social group is likely to influence his or her values,
interests, and judgments. Significantly, then, an individual can perceive him- or herself
as belonging to multiple social groups simultaneously, the specific groups can change,
and the boundaries of the various groups can change. Marilynn B. Brewer writes:
"[T]he self-concept is expandable and contractable across different levels of social
identity with associated transformations in the definition of self and the basis for
self-evaluation. When the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest
and self-serving motivation also changes accordingly. 77
The salience of an individual's identification with a particular social group varies
with surrounding circumstances. Tangible conflicts between social groups engender
greater cohesion within each group as well as a stronger separation between the
groups.78 In an empirical study of the 1928 presidential election, Allan J. Lichtman
identified a number of "antagonisms that allegedly sundered the nation into two
Americas during the 1920s: Catholics versus Protestants, wets versus drys, immigrants
versus natives, and city versus country."'79 Lichtman showed, however, that the over-
riding division governing the election was religious. Protestant anti-Catholicism
intensified in 1928 precisely because a Catholic, Al Smith, ran for President for the
first time.' The salience of the Protestant-Catholic separation became particularly
intense during that year. Afterward, anti-Catholicism receded to its more normal
level. " Given such variability of salience, one should recognize that an individual who
brings a free exercise exemption claim is likely to "'switch on"' ajudge's prejudices
against the claimant's religious group.82 Salience intensifies exactly because of the
nature of a free exercise claim. A free exercise claim accentuates conflict or difference:
a request for a court-ordered exemption from a general law amounts to a request for
special treatment because of religious differences (from the mainstream). 3
7' Brewer, supra note 13, at 476.
78 "[An individual will discriminate against a member of an out-group even when there
is no conflict of interest and there is no past history of intergroup hostility. .. ." van der
Dennen, supra note 13, at 17, 30; see T6nnesmann, supra note 13, at 184 (discussing how
people typically favor "dissimilar in-group members over similar out-group members").
79 ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, PREJUDICE AND THE OLDPoLiTics: THEPRESIDENTIALELECrION
OF 1928, at 25 (1979).
10 Id. at 74.
81 Lichtman explained that anti-Catholicism "lost its immediate salience." Id.
82 See Tonnesmann, supra note 13, at 184 (discussing how the salience of group member-
ship is "'switched on' in accordance with various situations); cf. Kimberly A. Moore,
Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1499-1501 (2003) (discussing
how xenophobic prejudices influence jury decision-making).
83 Cf. Lewis Z. Schlosser, Christian Privilege: Breaking a Sacred Taboo, 31 J.
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At the same time, given the variability of salience, one should also recognize that
a division-such as that between Protestants and Catholics-might have been espe-
cially important in 1928, or 1948, or any other time, but it is not necessarily the most
salient group division today, at least in many circumstances. Some commentators, for
instance, argue that one's political or ideological categorization likely outweighs
religion in shaping attitudes. From this perspective, the current division between
conservatives and progressives is more salient than the division between Protestants
and Catholics. Evangelical Protestants and conservative Catholics are more likely
to share overlapping values and interests than are liberal and conservative Protestants.s4
Other commentators suggest that an individual's degree of religiosity determines
attitudes more strongly than does religious denomination or grouping. The Sisk study
notes that:
[V]oter data from the most recent presidential election demon-
strates that a person's level of religious observance was a more
significant influence upon voting behavior than mere denomina-
tional affiliation. [With some exceptions], more religiously
observant Americans, across denominational lines, tended to
vote more conservatively (Republican) than their secular or less
devout counterparts."5
Finally, despite my focus in this Essay on the influence of religion on judicial
decision-making, law matters. I do not wish to prioritize an external or political science
approach to understanding adjudication. In fact, some recent political science-empirical
studies conclude that legal doctrines (or "jurisprudential regimes") influence judicial
decisions.8 6 Yet, simultaneously, one should not prioritize legal doctrine. A variety
of factors influence how judges interpret legal rules, principles, and precedents. Of
those other factors, empirical research shows that religion is often one of the most
important.
MULTICULTURAL COUNSEING & DEv. 44, 47 (2003) (emphasizing how American society
propagates Christian privilege vis-A-vis non-Christian religions).
8 Berg, supra note 73, at 123; Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making
Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAULL. REv. 499, 516-17 (1998); Sisk et
al., supra note 23, at 565-66; John Quist, Book Review, 20 L. & HIST. REv. 431,433 (2002).
85 Sisk et al., supra note 23, at 579.
86 Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court
Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 L. & SOC'Y REV.
827, 827-28 (2003); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 305,305-06 (2002).
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